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Abstract
The widely demonstrated ability of humans to deal with mul-
tiple representations of information has a number of impor-
tant implications for a proposed standard model of the mind
(SMM). In this paper we outline four and argue that a SMM
must incorporate (a) multiple representational formats and (b)
meta-cognitive processes that operate on them. We then de-
scribe current approaches to extend cognitive architectures
with visual-spatial representations, in part to illustrate the
limitations of current architectures in relation to the impli-
cations we raise but also to identify the basis upon which
a consensus about the nature of these additional representa-
tions can be agreed. We believe that addressing these impli-
cations and outlining a specification for multiple represen-
tations should be a key goal for those seeking to develop a
standard model of the mind.
Implications from a sample task
Cognitive architectures are operational models of the com-
ponents and functions of minds (Anderson 2007; Newell
1990). The standard model of the mind (SMM) is intended
to be a specification of those components and functions that
are generally accepted as essential to all flavours of cognitive
architecture (Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press). The
structure and content of the SMM is the subject of debate
to which we contribute by exploring the implications for the
SMM of the human use of multiple representations. We do
this in two halves. The first considers implications for the
SMM following from considerations of the use of multiple
representations while the second considers the current ap-
proaches in cognitive architecture to modelling visuo-spatial
and multiple representations.
Consider an example: Imagine a square with sides of one
unit. At opposite corners of the square add circles with radii
of 2/3 of a unit centred on the corners. Do the two circles (a)
overlap, (b) just touch, or (c) not touch? There are two com-
mon approaches that we have observed people use to solve
this problem. The first is mathematical and an idealised ver-
bal protocol might go something like this:
“The length of the diagonal between two opposite cor-
ners is the square root of 2—about 1.414 units—using
Pythagoras’ theorem, so the centre of the square is
about 0.707 units from each corner. The radius of each
circles is about 0.667 units, so neither circle’s perime-
ter will reach the centre of the square, and thus they do
not touch”.
The second approach is to use mental imagery and might
be accompanied by a verbal report something like this:
“I’m imagining a square and I’ve picked the top-left
and bottom-right corners. I can see that circles with unit
radius will definitely overlap; in fact they intersect each
other at the other corners of the square. Now I’m imag-
ining circles of 1/2 unit and I can see that they clearly
don’t meet, in fact the circles cross the mid point of
each side of the square and curve away from the cen-
tre. I’m thinking of circles with radii of 2/3, it’s hard
to be certain how big they should be, but they seem
to. . . overlap each other”.
“. . . just touch each other” or “. . . be separate” are also
likely responses. What implications for the SMM then fol-
low from this example, in relation to the use of multiple rep-
resentations? Let us consider four.
First, the two approaches rely upon quite different rep-
resentations for their solution—one declarative and math-
ematical, the other visuo-spatial and exploiting imagery
in the mind’s eye. Obviously, cognitive architectures must
encompass the use of alternative problem representations
(Markman 1998; Tabachneck-Schijf and Simon 1996), but
more importantly, our use of multiple representations sup-
ports the idea that the SMM should explicitly include mul-
tiple sub-modules for different modalities within each of
the main SMM declarative, procedural and working mem-
ory modules. For a given task the format of information,
operators, methods of indexing information, heuristics and
goal structures of a task can differ considerably with al-
ternative representations (Cheng, Lowe, and Scaife 2001;
Simon and Kaplan 1989; Larkin and Simon 1987).
Without the presence of sub-modules for different modal-
ities, cognitive models will be unrealistically homogeneous
parodies. For example, the use of imagery-based reason-
ing is so imprecise that reasoners are likely to give the
wrong answer, but this characteristic of mental imagery
is absent from the proposition-mathematical representation.
Markman’s detailed exposition on knowledge representation
(Markman 1998, summarised in Markman 2012) usefully
identifies three classes of representation used by humans,
which we believe a SMM should also encompass: men-
tal spaces, including generic spatial representations (Mark-
man 2012), geometric conceptual spaces (Ga¨rdenfors 2000),
and variable spaces (Halford et al. 2005); featural repre-
sentations in which discrete characteristic properties distin-
guish objects; and structured representations grounded in
networks that for example include semantic networks, logic-
based representations, scripts and schemas.
Second, some people are able to solve the sample prob-
lems using either approach (and even other methods), so
another implication for the standard model is how it deals
with multi-representational phenomena. These include: (a)
the choice of an initial task representation when an individ-
ual plans to use just one of several representations that they
know, for example starting with imagery; (b) switching rep-
resentation during problem solving, which can happen for
diverse reasons, for example, we may be uncertain of the an-
swer because we cannot precisely imagine the circles, or we
may not have the skill or knowledge to complete a solution
(e.g., perhaps we don’t remember the square root of two);
(c) simultaneously using two representations that would in
other circumstance be used alone.
The existence of different patterns of usage of multiple
representations raises the question of whether the cognitive
architecture possesses some general processes to handle the
selection of—and transitions between—representations, or
whether such processes are dealt with by meta-level domain
relations.
Third, use of multiple representations, either sequentially
or simultaneously, and whether based on domain specific or
general processes, will involve information beyond the do-
main level content of the representations. This higher order
information concerns the individual’s relation to the repre-
sentation. For example, we each have some personal under-
standing of the limited precision of mental imagery and may
make judgements about whether those limits make a solu-
tion too inaccurate to be relied upon, before we even start a
solution attempt.
Beyond the precision of a representation, we grasp many
other characteristics of representations and appear sensitive
to how well suited they are to different classes of problems.
So, an implication for the SSM is the status of the informa-
tion underpinning such knowledge about representations. Is
it generic architectural level meta-data, akin to process re-
lated frequencies or measures of similarity or utility (Laird,
Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press)? Does the information
take the form of meta-relations about the domain, where
the notion of what constitutes a domain includes concep-
tual content together with knowledge about the representa-
tion that encodes that content? Or does the information come
in both forms, some meta-data and meta-relations of domain
content?
Fourth, although our example starkly contrasts a
mathematical-propositional representation with a visuo-
spatial imagery-based representation, alternative represen-
tations can often occur within the same modality (Peebles
and Cheng 2003; Zhang and Norman 1994). For example,
in an alternative mathematical-propositional approach, we
might test whether the area between the perimeters of the
two quarter circles plus the area of the two quarter circles is
greater than that of the square (hence they overlap) by writ-
ing a formula for the distance between the circumferences of
the circles and using integral calculus to find the area. This
is a sledge-hammer-to-crack-a-nut approach for our sample
problem, but it is suggestive of a potential range of represen-
tations that may be deployed on any given task.
The underpinning question for a SMM is whether it
should recognise sub-modules for distinct classes of infor-
mation that inherently differentiate alternative representa-
tions at a level below the gross distinction between modali-
ties. Such classes of information might include:
• Types of quantity scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio),
which underpin distinct categorical, qualitative and quan-
titative forms of reasoning;
• Forms of symmetry, such a reflective, rotational and trans-
lational;
• Frames of reference, including egocentric and exocentric
environmental views.
Such classes of information are near universal and impli-
cated across diverse domains—Pinker (2011) even argues
that the quantity scales underpin four fundamental classes
of models in moral reasoning. So, we argue that such classes
should be treated as intrinsic in cognitive architectures and
thus should be included as fundamental sub-modules in a
SMM.
To summarise, we contend that the example scenario we
have described illustrates the widely demonstrated ability of
human cognition to deal with multiple representations of in-
formation and highlights four implications for a proposed
SMM:
1. A SMM must incorporate alternative problem representa-
tions and explicitly include multiple sub-modules for dif-
ferent modalities within each of the declarative, procedu-
ral and working memory modules.
2. A SMM must incorporate some form of metacognitive
monitoring and control processes to handle the selection
and monitoring of, transitions between, and integration of
different representations.
3. A SMM must be able to incorporate meta-level informa-
tion about the characteristics of different representational
formats (e.g., level of precision afforded, ease of compu-
tation, suitability for a given problem etc.).
4. A SMM must also be able to incorporate—and be able
to choose between—alternative representations within the
same modality.
These four implications follow fairly directly from the
sample task, but they are by no means unique claims, nor
are they a comprehensive set of potential representation-
ally related implications for cognitive architectures. Mark-
man (1998) gives seven proposals for the use of representa-
tions in cognitive models that partially overlap the four we
have identified and that also casts a wider net. One is the
proposal that cognitive models must attend to social con-
text in relation to representations, but this seems unlikely to
demand specific architectural commitments for the SMM.
However, Markman’s proposal that cognitive models must
use representations at multiple grain sizes lends weight to
our second claim that general procedures are needed to han-
dle multiple representations, because many tasks must in-
tegrate inferences about content at different spatial or con-
ceptual grain sizes, but often the content may be held—and
inferences made—in different representations.
Multiple representations in
cognitive architectures
The nature of mental representations is a fundamental issue
in cognitive science and one of the longest running debates
in this area has been whether mental imagery is supported by
abstract, amodal propositional representations or depictive
representations grounded in perception (Kosslyn and Pomer-
antz 1977; Pylyshyn 1973; Anderson 1978).
A key distinction between these forms of representation
is the degree to which they bear some structural correspon-
dence to what they represent. In contrast to abstract propo-
sitional representations for example, imagistic visual rep-
resentations depict rather than describe what they repre-
sent and retain the spatial relationships of their referents
by having elements with geometric properties organised to-
pographically (Reisberg 2013). Imagistic visual represen-
tations are not simply neutral depictions however but con-
tain interpretive information that acts as an organisational
reference frame describing such things as the level of de-
tail, specific viewing position and angle, figure-ground re-
lationships, orientation, configuration and occultation, sug-
gesting that some degree of propositional encoding is in-
cluded in imagistic visual representations (Kosslyn 1989;
Pinker 1990; Reisberg 2013).
Visual representations are also hierarchical in that they
are represented at multiple levels of abstraction (e.g., ob-
jects consisting of component parts) and hybrid as they con-
sist of distinct qualitative and quantitative elements at each
level (Lovett and Forbus 2017). The qualitative elements
are symbolic descriptions of the relations between objects
while the quantitative elements consist of measurable values
(e.g., coordinate location, size, orientation etc.) associated
with each object. The characteristics of these depictive rep-
resentations require processes grounded in perception (e.g.,
various transformations, projection, comparison etc.) and vi-
sual routines (Ullman 1984) to operate on them to enable
imagery-based reasoning in addition to symbolic represen-
tations and processes.
Cognitive architectures are rooted in the classical tradi-
tion of cognitive science and the physical symbol system hy-
pothesis (Newell and Simon 1976) and so, until relatively
recently, have relied predominantly on amodal symbolic rep-
resentations. The need to represent diverse information for-
mats in cognitive architectures and computational models
has been recognised for many years however and a number
of approaches to this problem have been proposed which we
outline below.
Proposed depictive representations
Accepting the argument for modal depictive representations,
the question then arises as to what and how information is
represented and what processes operate upon them. Several
proposals have been put forward to address the issue of de-
pictive representations which can differentiated in terms of
where they lie on the representational spectrum—ranging
from purely array based pixel maps and associated transfor-
mational processes to more abstract representations consist-
ing of discrete objects with their visual and spatial proper-
ties1.
An example of the former is the recent affine model of
problem solving on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test
(Kunda, McGreggor, and Goel 2013) which exclusively em-
ploys representations consisting of two-dimensional arrays
of grayscale pixels with operations restricted to the orthogo-
nal unary transformations of rotation, reflection and transla-
tion and composition operations to implement image union,
intersection, subtraction, back-subtraction, and exclusive-or
transformations. Using these representations and processes
alone, the affine model is able solve between 55% and 63%
of Standard Progressive Matrices problems. It remains un-
clear to what extent this relatively restricted set of represen-
tations and processes can be extended to other, more com-
plex tasks.
At the other end of the spectrum are systems that es-
chew any lower-level pixel-based format and processes but
represent visual information more abstractly. An influen-
tial cognitive model which incorporated such representa-
tions is Koedinger and Anderson’s (1990) Diagram Config-
uration Model (DCM). Developed to account for the perfor-
mance of expert geometry problem solving, a crucial aspect
of the DCM was that expert knowledge was represented as
schemas combining a geometric image (e.g., perpendicular-
adjacent-angles) with associated facts. Identifying these im-
ages in the diagram activated the schemas and allowed rapid
access to the interpretive knowledge.
A similar approach has been taken to account for expert
graph comprehension performance (Peebles 2013). Con-
structed within the ACT-R cognitive architecture, the model
represents expert interpretive knowledge as a set of facts and
rule-based processes triggered by recognition cues (typically
distances between plot points) from the graph.
A more generally applicable example of this approach
is the Diagrammatic Representation System (DRS) (Chan-
drasekaran 2006; Chandrasekaran et al. 2004; Chan-
drasekaran and Lele 2010) which represents diagrams as a
data structure containing three basic types of object (point,
1In our discussion we focus exclusively on systems and mod-
els designed for two-dimensional perception for diagrammatic rea-
soning and interacting with screen-based task environments. De-
veloping cognitive architectures that are capable of functioning
in fully three-dimensional environments as embodied agents and
robots will no doubt require more complex representations and
processes, for example to incorporate different frames of reference
(McNamara, Rump, and Werner 2003). There are a number of ef-
forts towards this goal using some of the cognitive architectures we
discuss (Trafton et al. 2013; Kirk, Mininger, and Laird 2016).
curve and region). DRS also contains a set of perceptual rou-
tines that identify object features (e.g., angle, length) and
spatial relations between objects (e.g., left-of, inside-of, dis-
tance etc.) and a set of action routines that create and modify
objects (e.g., translate, rotate etc.). DRS has been integrated
with several existing cognitive architectures including ACT-
R (Matessa and Brockett 2007), Soar (Chandrasekaran and
Kurup 2007) and Polyscheme (Kurup and Cassimatis 2010).
The ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson 2007) has a
somewhat similar (although less comprehensive) method of
representing visual information through its vision module.
Objects in the simulated external environment that ACT-R
interacts with are represented by two symbolic chunks in
declarative memory, one representing their features (e.g.,
type, shape, colour etc.), the other representing their co-
ordinate location. These representations have been useful
in allowing ACT-R models to interact with computer-based
psychology experiments and simulated computer interfaces.
ACT-R can also represent and manipulate (e.g., translate and
rotate) visual information internally using its imaginal mod-
ule. Unlike DRS however, these abilities, as with many other
ACT-R models of spatial cognition (Dimperio, Gunzelmann,
and Harris 2008; Peebles 2013) are only made possible by
using ad hoc mechanisms which are not intrinsic to the ar-
chitecture.
Two systems with currently the most well developed and
comprehensive sets of representations in this category are
the Spatial/Visual System (SVS) (Lathrop, Wintermute, and
Laird 2011; Wintermute 2012), an extension of the Soar cog-
nitive architecture (Laird 2012) and the sketch understand-
ing system CogSketch (Forbus et al. 2011).
Until recently, SVS contained two layers of representa-
tion: a visual depictive layer (a bitmap array representa-
tion of space and the topological structure of objects), and
a quantitative spatial layer (an amodal symbolic/numerical
representation of objects and their spatial coordinates) but
the visual depictive level has been omitted from the most
recent (9.6.0) version of Soar. Now, SVS is just the quan-
titative spatial layer which consists of a scene graph, a
hierarchical tree structure representation of the objects in
the external task environment, each with associated three-
dimensional information about its location, rotation and
scaling. SVS also contains a number of operations to trans-
form objects in the scene graph and a set of filters which
transform the continuous information in the scene graph into
symbolic information that can be used by Soar for reason-
ing. These processes allow Soar agents to perform mental
imagery operations that can manipulate the scene graph and
then extract spatial relationships from the modified states
(Laird et al. 2017).
CogSketch takes as input a 2D sketch consisting of a set of
separate objects, and generates a representation of the quali-
tative spatial relations between them, including relative posi-
tion and topological relations such as containment and inter-
section. The generated representations form a three-level hi-
erarchy of edges, shapes and groups, each with descriptions
of the elements and relations at that level. These representa-
tions are then used by other (typically analogical) processes
for visual problem solving (Lovett and Forbus 2011).
An early and influential cognitive model is notable in
its combination of a pixel array based representation with
more abstract representations containing information about
the properties of the objects and their spatial relationships.
The CaMeRa model of expert problem solving with multiple
representations (Tabachneck-Schijf, Leonardo, and Simon
1997) includes a pictorial short-term memory (or ‘Mind’s
Eye’) consisting of a visual buffer (a 150×150 pixel bitmap
and parallel network) that represents the external diagram
together with two additional data structures, one containing
higher-level information about the shape, colour, and form
of the objects in the bitmap, the other representing the loca-
tions of the objects in the array.
This combination of representations and processes creates
what the authors call a “complete mental image” which al-
lows complex visual reasoning with an external representa-
tion of a graph using both the parallel network and sym-
bolic structures. The visual buffer can contain perceptual
images from both the external diagram and mental images
retrieved from pictorial long-term memory and mediates be-
tween them and the symbolic structures in short-term mem-
ory using feature extraction and Gestalt processes to identify
objects in the external diagram. The hybrid nature of CaM-
eRa with its combined feed-forward parallel network and
production system architecture and amalgamation of bitmap
and symbolic representations presents a unique example of
a computational model of cognition with multiple represen-
tations.
The above discussion illustrates the range of models that
incorporate multiple representations and the diversity of
approaches used—from exclusively array-based represen-
tations to exclusively symbolic/numerical representations,
and some which have combined both. This demonstrates the
widely held conviction that multiple representations in some
form or another are crucial for explaining human cognition
and are an essential element in any model of the human
mind.
Implications for a standard model of the mind
In an influential paper, Newell (1973) proposed a strat-
egy for overcoming the limitations he perceived in the ap-
proach to cognitive psychology at the time which has been
a cornerstone of cognitive architecture research ever since.
Newell advocated constructing complete processing models
that could account for all aspects of one single complex task
in great detail or to a wide range of different tasks. This has
no doubt been a productive approach which has resulted in
significant theoretical advances. We believe that the issue of
alternative representations—both as internal components of
the cognitive system and as external task environments—
constitute an additional dimension to the strategy proposed
by Newell which must be incorporated into any standard
model of the mind.
A key issue in this regard concerns the nature of the rep-
resentations that a SMM must incorporate in addition to the
core symbolic system proposed in the initial SMM specifica-
tion of Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom (in press). For exam-
ple, it is not clear whether mental imagery must be supported
by some form of bitmap representation depicting the topo-
logical structure of objects or whether these functions can
be performed using more complex representations contain-
ing edges, lines, shapes and quantitative information such as
spatial coordinates extracted from the perceptual system. In
other words, is there something necessary about pixel array
based representations and processes that means they have
to me incorporated into a cognitive architecture or can an-
other computationally equivalent way of representing and
processing this information be used?
Although pixel arrays have a number of useful properties
for spatial processing, none of the current cognitive archi-
tectures employ them but typically rely exclusively on sym-
bolic/numerical representations. Further research should in-
vestigate the computational capabilities of different repre-
sentations by modelling tasks that require multiple internal
and external representations to provide behavioural evidence
for which representations are being used.
The different models we have outlined above illustrate the
limitations of current architectures in relation to the implica-
tions we have raised and it is clear that, despite recent devel-
opments, few of our proposed requirements are capable of
being met by existing cognitive architectures. The examples
also demonstrate however the growing conviction that theo-
ries of the human cognitive architecture must extend the set
of representations and endow cognitive architectures with
mechanisms for visual-spatial cognition and mental imagery
and there is seems to be a consensus on two points—that (a)
imagistic representations consist of hierarchically structured
objects with their properties (e.g., shape, relative size and
orientation) and the spatial relationships between them, and
that (b) images and imagery-based reasoning are grounded
in representations and processes that function to provide op-
erations and routines utilising visual and spatial information
which is not exclusively symbolic.
Beyond these general statements however there is little
in the way of explicit agreement regarding the architectural
commitments of a SMM and we believe that this should be a
primary goal for those seeking to develop a standard model
of the mind and a priority for future development in cogni-
tive architecture research.
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